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state tax notes®
Why States Can Tax the GILTI
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage

Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of
law at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors explain how states can tax
global intangible low-taxed income.
The most critical weakness of the modern
corporate income tax is its vulnerability to profit
shifting, through which corporate taxpayers can
engage in tax planning to report profits in
foreign tax havens or low-tax jurisdictions. The
1
sweeping 2017 federal tax legislation made
three changes that dramatically affect this
problem: (1) The federal corporate tax rate was
reduced from 35 percent to 21 percent; (2) the
corporate tax base was switched from being
based on the worldwide income of U.S.
corporate taxpayers to a territorial system in
which corporate taxpayers’ foreign income is
potentially exempt from tax; and (3) new

1

For broader discussion and critique of related aspects of the 2017
federal tax legislation, see David Kamin et al., “The Games They Will
Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax
Legislation,”103 Minn. L. Rev. 1439, 1488-1514 (2019).

antiabuse rules were implemented to combat
profit shifting, perhaps the most important of
which is the global intangible low-taxed income
regime.
GILTI is a new federal tax provision that
seeks to identify income displaced out of the
United States by ascertaining whether it was the
product of an unusually high rate of return. An
unusually high rate of return is interpreted as a
proxy indicating that the income in question
was actually earned somewhere other than
where it was reported.
We have already argued that states should
2
conform to GILTI. But might there be
constitutional restrictions preventing states
from doing so? In this article, we argue that
state governments can constitutionally conform
to the federal GILTI rules and thereby tax GILTI
income as part of the states’ corporate income
tax bases. However, in doing so, we explain that
state governments will need to be attentive to
background constitutional principles.
A state is permitted to use a reasonable
formula to approximate how much of a
multijurisdictional enterprise’s income can be
fairly apportioned to the state. The burden on
the taxpayer challenging the formula is then
heavy, as it must “prove by clear and cogent
evidence that the income attributed to the State
is in fact out of all appropriate proportions to
3
the business transacted in that State.”

2

See Darien Shanske and David Gamage, “Why States Should Tax the
GILTI,”State Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 2019, p. 751. Our conclusions are
substantively similar to the excellent analyses of Walter Hellerstein and
Jon Sedon, “State Corporate Income Tax Consequences of Federal Tax
Reform,” State Tax Notes, Apr. 16, 2018, p. 187; and Lee A. Sheppard, “Is
Taxing GILTI Constitutional?” State Tax Notes, July 30, 2018, p. 439. Our
column is focused on objections to taxing GILTI that have emerged since
these two articles were written; we also delve further into the details of
how states can tax GILTI.
3

Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983)
(internal citations omitted).
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In deciding how much income of a
conglomerate enterprise a state can subject to its
formula, the state is limited by the unitary
4
business principle. Under the unitary business
principle, states may include the (operational)
income nominally earned abroad in their
formula approximations as long as the foreign
businesses are engaged in a unitary business.5
Spokespeople for business taxpayers and their
allies sometimes speak of mandatory
worldwide combination (and of GILTI
conformity) as if they were designed to tax
6
foreign income. But this is inaccurate. Instead,
what these provisions do is to look to income
nominally earned elsewhere to arrive at a more
accurate estimate of income earned in a state.
Up to this point, analysis of GILTI inclusion
7
(as well as the repatriation) is rather
straightforward. The primary challenge is
constructing a reasonable formula. After all,
even if all GILTI income has been shifted out of
some other jurisdiction, not necessarily all of
that income has been shifted out of the United
States. This raises the question of factor
representation, which we will address below.
One thing to note is that the basic constitutional
rules of apportionment do not dictate how
foreign factors are to be represented, as long as
the approach is reasonable. Thus, because the
whole purpose of GILTI’s calculation rules is to
ferret out income not produced by the foreign
assets that the taxpayer claims is responsible for
them, the foreign income that GILTI identifies
through these calculations should not be treated
the same as other foreign income. Accordingly,
the states should be permitted to use a formula
other than their standard formula for nonGILTI foreign income to reasonably determine
how much of this income should be
apportioned to the state.

4

The U.S. Supreme Court has applied these
background principles to arrive at what is
effectively this same conclusion in a similar
context. Consider the facts in Hunt-Wesson v.
Franchise Tax Board.8 In that case, the Court
struck down a California rule that ascribed all
interest expense first to non-unitary businesses.
The Court held that this rule went too far.
Nevertheless, the Court understood that
California had enacted the rule to counter the
difficulty of ascertaining whether an interest
expense was actually undertaken to reduce
income of a California business that would
otherwise be taxable by the state. Thus, the
Court went out of its way to bless “ratio-based
rules” used by the states and the federal
government in this (interest) context and other
similar contexts.
As applied to the GILTI question, it seems
clear that if a ratio-based rule can be used to
disentangle suspect expenses, such a rule
should also be permitted for disentangling
suspect income, including GILTI income.
Kraft v. Iowa, Take 1
9

Some believe that under Kraft v. Iowa, states
cannot conform to GILTI at all — or, if they can,
that they can only do so by using an
apportionment formula that treats GILTI the
same as the income produced by domestic
subsidiaries. Kraft is not actually about
apportionment. The state in Kraft, Iowa, was a
separate reporting state. Following the federal
definition of taxable income, Iowa taxed
dividends received from foreign subsidiaries,
but not dividends derived from domestic
subsidiaries. Despite several arguments in favor
of the Iowa structure, including administrative
convenience and that this structure does not
necessarily have any discriminatory impact,10
the Court struck down the law as facially
discriminatory against foreign commerce.

Allied-Signal v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992).

5

Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159; and Barclay’s Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
6

Indeed, the very title of the Tax Foundation report on GILTI is
inaccurate on this score. Jared Walczak, “GILTI Minds: Why Some States
Want to Tax International Income — And Why They Shouldn’t,” Tax
Foundation (Jan. 28, 2019).
7

As explained in a prior article, we believe that it is not too late for
states to do the right thing and tax the repatriation. See Shanske and
Gamage, “Why (and How) States Should Tax the Repatriation,” State Tax
Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 317.
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8

Hunt-Wesson Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 528 U.S. 458, 467468 (2000).
9

Kraft General Foods Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, 505
U.S. 71 (1992).
10

The Iowa structure clearly did not advantage Iowa businesses. In
general, Kraft is not a compelling decision, and the dissent by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist (joined by Justice Harry Blackmun) seems
to get the better of the argument.
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Some leading commentators have argued
that Kraft established a rule that a state cannot
treat foreign-source income less favorably than
11
domestic-source income. Applied to the GILTI
question, commentators have argued that GILTI
is foreign-source income and, as such, must be
apportioned just like domestic-source income,
or else this would result in impermissible
12
discrimination under Kraft.
However, even before analyzing Kraft
further, this is a surprisingly prescriptive
conclusion, and one that runs against the mass
of precedent that gives states considerable
leeway in taxing multijurisdictional enterprises
— leeway that makes sense given the respect
the states are due as sovereigns trying to
13
exercise a core function of revenue-raising.
Moreover, there are multiple flaws with this
argument as an interpretation of what Kraft
demands regarding GILTI income. First, the
statute in question in Kraft was based on a
simple binary — the income in question would
either be subject to tax or exempt. There was
thus no discussion in Kraft of whether having a
different apportionment formula for foreignsource income would be permissible. As we
have already explained, the general
constitutional rules governing fair
apportionment grant the states considerable
leeway in designing their formulas. So if states
can apportion the income of financial services
companies differently and can add back
14
suspicious deductions or have special water’sedge rules for income earned in tax havens —

11

See, e.g., Joseph X. Donovan et al., “State Taxation of GILTI: Policy
and Constitutional Ramifications,” State Tax Notes, Oct. 22, 2018, p. 315.

none of which has been deemed
constitutionally problematic — it then seems
clear that Kraft should not bar states from
applying some special formula for GILTI
income, as long as that formula uses a
reasonable method for approximating how
much of that income should be apportioned to
the state.
Second, the Court in Kraft emphasized that
it was treating the dividends at issue in Kraft as
foreign-sourced: “The only subsidiary dividend
payments taxed by Iowa are those reflecting the
foreign business activity of foreign
15
subsidiaries.” The Court did not reach the
question whether it would be constitutional for
a state to treat some portion of nominally
foreign earnings as actually earned
domestically. Again, general constitutional
principles and the holdings of Container and
Barclays indicate that states are entitled to use
nominally foreign income as a reference point
in their calculations. Furthermore, Hunt-Wesson
answers the analogous question about
deductions clearly: States can use a reasonable
ratio-based rule to apportion deductions that
the state has good reason to believe are
misreported.
Kraft v. Iowa, Take 2 — Factor Representation
To summarize our argument so far: States
can conform to GILTI and, in doing so, can use
any reasonable formula to disentangle how
much GILTI income should be apportioned.
Therefore, the states need not — and as a policy
matter, should not — use an apportionment
formula that assumes, in effect, that GILTI
income is true foreign income, because the
whole purpose of GILTI is to identify
misrepresented income, a portion of which was
actually earned within the United States rather

12

Id.

13

As the Supreme Court has explained, there is a “strong background
principle against federal interference with state taxation.” National
Private Truck Council Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582, 589
(1995).
14

We are focusing our discussion on combined reporting states, as it
seems odd for a state concerned with income stripping not to start with
domestic income stripping. Nevertheless, contrary to what many claim,
we do not think it at all obvious that a separate reporting state cannot
conform to GILTI. Separate reporting states can and do have addback
statutes to protect their tax base, so we don’t see why they cannot
conform to GILTI as a kind of addback statute targeting international
income shifting.

15

Kraft, 505 U.S. at 77.
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than in the foreign jurisdictions in which it was
reported to have been earned.
For example, a state might first use some
reasonable formula for estimating what portion
of GILTI income was displaced out of the
United States and then subject that number to a
domestic apportionment formula for assessing
how much of that income should be taxed by
the state. This is our understanding of how New
Jersey has approached GILTI conformity.16 First,
New Jersey uses conformity to the 50 percent
17
deduction given under IRC section 250 to
estimate how much income has been stripped
out of the U.S. tax base relative to the rest of the
18
world. New Jersey then uses its share of

16

Shanske has consulted with New Jersey on its approach.

17

We do not think that states must offer the 50 percent deduction on
federal supremacy grounds. After all, we consider it a close question
whether the federal government could explicitly require states to levy
corporate income taxes within certain rate bands; see Gamage and
Shanske, “The Federal Government’s Power to Restrict State Taxation,”
State Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 2016, p. 547. By contrast, it is not a close question
whether a federal government deduction with no mention of the states
can be interpreted to preempt how states structure their taxing authority.
Because it is unnecessary that states conform to the IRC section 250
deduction, we observe that conforming to it can be helpful for building a
reasonable apportionment method.
18

But why is the 50 percent reasonable? There is evidence that, out of
the total income shifted out of higher tax jurisdictions, percentages as
high as 42 percent are shifted out of the United States. Clearly, any first
cut below 42 percent looks reasonable. A state like New Jersey might
reasonably choose to go with a slightly higher estimate because: (1) it
recognizes the limits of these estimates and is seeking to be conservative
with the public fisc; (2) it recognizes that there will now be more
incentive for taxpayers to shift income out of the United States as a result
of the federal-level shift away from taxing worldwide income and that
the future numbers may be higher; and (3) a relatively high-tax state
might reasonably believe that income is slightly more likely to be shifted
out of its tax base as compared to the U.S. average. For these reasons, we
view New Jersey’s use of 50 percent as a somewhat aggressive, but not
unreasonable, estimate for how much income has been stripped out of
the U.S. tax base relative to the rest of the world.
Alex Cobham and Petr Janský provide evidence for a 37 percent
share and analyze an IMF team report as providing evidence of a 42
percent U.S. share. Cobham and Janský, “Global Distribution of Revenue
Loss From Tax Avoidance: Re-estimation and Country Results,” 30 J. Int’l
Dev. 206 (2018) (see Table A-2); and Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud De Mooij, and
Michael Keen, “Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries,”
72 FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 268 (2016).
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domestic GDP to apportion this estimated
amount to the state.19
Using an approach like New Jersey’s should
be constitutionally permissible. But does this
mean we believe that some foreign-factor
representation is strictly required? Not
necessarily, although we do think that some
reasonable explanation of an approach is
advisable. In a subsequent article, we plan to
address whether a state might permissibly go
further than New Jersey and forgo representing
foreign factors in the GILTI context.
Conclusion
As we argued in our prior article,20 state
governments should conform to GILTI because
it is an effective way to broaden their corporate
tax bases with relatively little administrative
burden. In this article, we explained that it is
clearly constitutionally permissible for state
governments to conform to GILTI.
In theory, there might be better policy
alternatives to simply conforming to GILTI. For
instance, states could implement an improved
version of GILTI or adopt mandatory
worldwide combination. However, these
options would all require more effort in terms
of design, implementation, and administration.
We think ease of practical attainability should
win the day — at least in the short term. We
urge state governments to incorporate GILTI
income in their corporate income tax bases. The
goal of preserving the besieged state corporate
income tax base requires taking this relatively
easy opportunity to broaden it, and this
opportunity is one worth taking.


19

But is the use of GDP reasonable? We have been surprised that
there has been such hyperbole from the private bar to the effect that it is
not. See Amy Hamilton, “All the Talk: New Jersey’s Unique Method for
Apportioning GILTI,” State Tax Notes, Feb. 25, 2019, p. 717. We think it is
reasonable for a state that uses the single sales factor to expect that, on
balance, sales in the state should track the economic value created in the
state. Other approaches, such as using a taxpayer’s apportionment
factors without taking GILTI into account, would also be reasonable. A
state might opt for the GDP approach on the theory that the ordinary
sales factor for a taxpayer with GILTI is already compromised, especially
as to GILTI itself. Furthermore, the use of GDP in this context is a
defeasible presumption because of the availability of alternative
apportionment (not to mention not taking the water’s-edge election).
20

Shanske and Gamage, supra note 2.
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